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THE BACKGROUND OF THE LABOR PROVISIONS
OF THE N.I.R.A.
EDWIN E. WiTmT*NO OTHER part of the National Industrial Recovery Act' has
aroused so much controversy as Section 7(a) .2 ,This section has
been given radically different interpretations by labor leaders
and the spokesmen of organized business. Disagreements over this sec-
tion delayed the steel, automobile, and coal codes. At one time the entire
Industrial Advisory Board threatened to resign because General Johnson
at the instance of the Labor Advisory Board issued a statement that no
qualifications of this section would be permitted in any future code.
Thereafter, the Industrial Advisory Board and a majority of the Labor
Advisory Board reached an agreement upon an interpretation to be in-
cluded in all codes, but this was blocked by the President, who took the
position that any advance interpretation "leads only to further contro-
versy and confusion."3 Since then it has been understood that interpreta-
tions will be made only by the National Labor Board and the courts as
concrete cases arise demanding decision. Following this decision of the
President the controversy over Section 7 (a) remained quiescent for some
months, but recently has again flared brightly. Several large employers
have openly defied the National Labor Board and numerous industrial
leaders have boldly asserted that they will deal only with company
unions and that they are within their rights in taking such an attitude.
The National Association of Manufacturers has even advanced the claim 4
that the National Industrial Recovery Act renders closed shop agree-
ments illegal. The American Federation of Labor has countered by de-
manding that company unions be definitely outlawed and Senator Wag-
ner has announced his intention of introducing a bill to clarify and
strengthen Section 7(a).
* Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
'Public Act No. 67, 73d Congress; 48 Stat. c. go, approved June i6, 1933.
2 Really subsection (a) of section 7, but referred to as Section 7(a) in all discussions, and
hence so designated in this article.
3 Letter to General Hugh S. Johnson, Administrator for National Recovery, Oct. 19, 1933.
4 New York Times, Nov. 19, 1933, p. x5.
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Throughout this controversy, Section 7(a) has been treated as though
it represented a new and radical departure, entirely without precedent.
In fact, however, both of the essential provisions of this section-the
affirmative recognition of the right of workingmen to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choice and the prohibition of inter-
ference by employers with the exercise of this right-are but restatements
of principles previously recognized in several acts of Congress and, earliest
of all, by the National War Labor Board during the World War, when
that board was the supreme authority upon industrial relations in a large
part of American industry.
The board, of which ex-President William Howard Taft and Frank P.
Walsh were the joint chairmen, included the following among the Prin-
ciples and Policies to Govern Relations between Workers and Employers
in War Industries for the Duration of the War which it promulgated on
March 29, 1918, to govern "its mediating and conciliatory action and the
umpire in his consideration of a controversy":
r. The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain collectively through
chosen representatives is recognized and affirmed. This right shall not be denied,
abridged, or interfered with by the employers in any manner whatsoever.
3. Employers shall not discharge workers for membership in trade unions, nor for legit-
imate trade union activities.
Next, these principles were expressed in the Railway Labor Act of
1926 :5
Representatives, for the purposes of this chapter, shall be designated by the respective
parties in such manner as may be provided in their corporate organization or unincor-
porated association, or by other means of collective action, without interference, in-
fluence, or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization or designation
of representatives by the other.
This provision of the Railway Labor Act was sustained and construed
by the United States Supreme Court in the Railway Clerks' case,6 decided
in 1930. In this case the evidence conclusively established that the rail-
road company involved organized and all but operated the company
union and in every manner sought to make its employees members of this
union in preference to the railway clerks' union. Upon this evidence and
on the basis of the section of the Railway Labor Act quoted, the court
affirmed the order issued by the district court prohibiting the company
from interfering with the right of employees to join the railway clerks'
union and directing it to dissolve the company union. In its decision the
44 Stat. 577 (1926); 45 U. S. C. Supp. § 152, "Third" (1933).
6Texas and New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 28I
US. 548, 5c Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930).
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court not only upheld the statute but expressed approval of its evident
purpose, saying that "collective action would be a mockery if representa-
tion were made futile by interference with the freedom of choice." It
construed the provision quoted as involving no interference with "the
normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to dis-
charge them," and as being directed only against "interference with the
right of employees to have representatives of their own choosing."
Enacted after this decision but drafted before it was handed down, the
Norris-La Guardia (anti-injunction) Act,7 in its "declaration of policy"
declared that
.... it is necessary that he [the worker] have full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representa-
tives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ..... 8
This act further provided that contracts in which workingmen obligate
themselves not to join a labor union violate this policy and shall not be
enforced in any court of the United States.
In the following session of the same Congress a similar provision was
inserted in the Bankruptcy Act,9 which, like the Norris-La Guardia Act,
was approved by President Hoover:
(p) No judge or trustee acting under this title shall deny or in any way question the
right of employees on the property under his jurisdiction to join the labor organization
of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any judge, trustee, or receiver to interfere in
any way with the organization of employees, or to use the funds of the railroad under
his jurisdiction, in maintaining so-called company unions, or to influence or coerce em-
ployees in an effort to induce them to join or remain members of such company union.
(q) No judge, trustee, or receiver acting under this title shall require any person seek-
ing employment on the property under his jurisdiction to sign any contract or agree-
ment promising to join or to refuse to join a labor organization; and if such contract has
been enforced on the property prior to the property coming under the jurisdiction of
said judge, trustee, or receiver, then the said judge, trustee, or receiver, as soon as the
matter is called to his attention, shall notify the employees by an appropriate order
that said contract has been discarded and is no longer binding on them in any way.
Coming now (chronologically) to the special session of the present
Congress, these principles were again affirmed in the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933,"0 which was approved on the same day as the
7 47 Stat. 7- (1932), 29 U. S. C. Supp. §§ 101-i 5 (1933).
8 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. Supp. § X02 (1933).
947 Stat. 1474 (1933), ii U. S. C. Supp. § 205 (i933).
1o Public Act No. 68, 73d Congress; 48 Stat. c. or, approved June 16, 1933.
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National Industrial Recovery Act. This act included a clause to the effect
that all "carriers, whether under the control of a judge, trustee, receiver,
or private management, shall be required to comply with the provisions
of Chapter 8 of Title 45 [the above quoted provision of the Bankruptcy
Act] and with the provisions of paragraphs (o), (p) and (q) of Section 205
of Title ii [the sections of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 involved in
the Railway Clerks' case]." To carry out this requirement, Coordinator
of Transportation Joseph B. Eastman early in September notified all of
the railroad companies that they must divest themselves of all connection
with company unions.
This brings us to the National Industrial Recovery Act, Section 7(a)
of which is the provision whose background we have traced. Very sig-
nificantly, this act is reported to have been drafted by Donald R. Rich-
berg, now Chief Counsel of the N.R.A. Earlier Mr. Richberg was the
draftsman of the Railway Labor Act, attorney for the labor unions in the
Railway Clerks' case, and one of the draftsmen of the Norris-La Guardia
Act. Thoroughly familiar with all the earlier enactments cited, Mr. Rich-
berg incorporated the same principles in the original draft of the National
Industrial Recovery Act." In the original form the much debated Sec-
tion 7(a) read:
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued
under this tite shall contain the following conditions: (i) that employees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condi-
tion of employment to join any organization or to refrain from joining a labor organiza-
tion of his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours
of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other working conditions, approved or prescribed
by the President.
When this bill came on for a hearing before the Ways and Means Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives it was indorsed both by H. I.
Harriman, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, and
William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor. Mr.
Green, however, suggested amendments to Section 7(a)"2 to make the
first two subdivisions read:
(i) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representa-
"H. R. 5755 and S. 1712, 73d Congress, 1st Sess. (933).
"Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives on
National Industrial Recovery, May 1933, 117-132.
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tives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or as-
sisting a labor organization of his own choosing.
These suggestions were accepted by the committee and incorporated in
the bill which it reported to the House. This bill then passed without
change and without any discussion of Section 7(a).
When the bill as amended came on for a hearing before 'the Senate
Finance Committee, it was subjected to a concerted attack by spokesmen
for business interests. 3 Mr. Harriman now advised the committee: "In
my judgment, changes should be made in Sections 6 and 7 to make it
perfectly clear that the principles of true open-shop operation are not
contravened." This was also the sum and substance of the plea of R. P.
Lamont, representing the American Iron and Steel Institute. E. L.
Michael of the Virginia Manufacturers' Association and Charles R. Hook
of the American Rolling Mill Company protested the clause relating to
the company union, urging that it would be construed as making the
company union illegal.14 James A. Emery, representing the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers, suggested an amendment to the effect that
Section 7 be eliminated and that instead there be added to Section 3(a) the
following clauses, as conditions to be incorporated in all industrial codes:
(i) That employers and employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively in any form mutually satisfactory to them through representatives of their own
choosing.
(2) That no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join or refrain from joining any legitimate organization, nor shall any
persons be precluded from bargaining individually for employment.
The Senate Finance Committee did not accept the Emery amendment,
but it recommended an amendment in the form of a proviso to be added
to Section 7(a), which read:
Provided that nothing in this title shall be construed to compel a change in existing
satisfactory relations between the employers and the employees in any particular plant,
firm, or corporation, except that the employees of any particular plant, firm, or corpo-
ration shall have the right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining with their
employees as to wages, hours of labor, or other conditions of employment.
,3 Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on Sen. Rep. 1712 and H. R. Rep. 5755
(National Industrial Recovery), May-June 1933, 407-408 (Harriman), 394-395 (Lamont);
377-382 (Michael), 388-39 c (Hook), 288-291 (Emery).
14 John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, answered this argu-
ment by saying that the act did not prohibit company unions but only coercion of employees
to belong to a company union. Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee on Sen. Rep.
1712 and H. R. Rep. 5755 (National Industrial Recovery), 404-405.
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When the bill reached the Senate floor on June 8, the amendment of the
Finance Committee was adopted without explanation or roll call. Later
in the same day, Senator Norris, who had been absent when this
amendment was adopted, asked for and secured a reconsideration. A
prolonged debate followed, s which throws much light upon the intent
of Congress in enacting Section 7(a). Senators Norris, Wheeler, Cos-
tigan, Bone, Robinson (Ind.), and Wagner all attacked the amendment,
while Senators Reed, Hastings, and Clark defended the committee.
The critics centered their attack upon the fact that the proviso qualified
the right of collective bargaining and gave the appearance of govern-
mental sanction of the company union, which Senator Norris described
as "one of the great evils that labor has had to fight against." None
of the senators speaking for the amendment said one word in favor of the
company union but based their case upon the fact that General Johnson
and Mr. Richberg had been present when the committee agreed upon this
amendment and offered no objections. At the conclusion of the debate,
the Senate, by a roll call vote of thirty-one to forty-six, refused to readopt
the Finance Committee amendment. No further attempt to amend Sec-
tion 7(a) was made at any stage, so that this section reads in the final act
precisely as it passed the House of Representatives.
Note must here be taken of a statement issued by the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers in November, 1933, to the effect that closed shop
contracts were rendered illegal by two Senate amendments to the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act. 6 One of these was the Borah amendment
to Section 3(a), which added the proviso: "That such code or codes shall
not permit combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing or other
monopolistic purposes" (changed by the conference committee before
final passage to read: "That such code or codes shall not permit mo-
15 77 Congressional Record 5412-5417 (June 8, 1933). The roll call vote on the Finance
Committee amendment is given on 5417.
16 This statement was published in the New York Times, Nov. i9, 933, P. 15. For the
Borah amendment and the debate thereon, see 77 Congressional Record 5381-5382 (June 8,
1933); on the Long amendment, ibid., 5424.
Another contention in support of the view that closed shop agreements have been ren-
dered illegal by the National Industrial Recovery Act is based upon clause (2) in Section 7(a),
which provides that no employee or applicant for employment shall be required "to refrain from
joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choice." Assuming that a com-
pany union is a "labor organization," it is argued that employers are forbidden to enter into
closed shop agreements if any employee prefers membership in a company union. Upon this
contention nothing more needs to be said than that the term "labor organization" was under-
stood at all stages of the National Industrial Recovery Act to refer to independent labor unions
and that no member of Congress even suggested that this act might make closed shop agree-
ments unlawful.
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nopolies or monopolistic practices"). The other was the Long amend-
ment, which added to Section 5 the following paragraph:
Nothing in this Act, and no regulation thereunder, shall prevent an individual from
pursuing the vocation of manual labor and selling or trading the products thereof; nor
shall anything in this Act, or regulation thereunder, prevent anyone from marketing or
trading the produce of his farm.
What there is in these amendments which forbids the closed shop is not
apparent and the debate on these amendments lends no support to the
contention of the National Association of Manufacturers. Both amend-
ments were adopted without a roll call and no one who discussed them so
much as mentioned the closed shop. Both were presented as being de-
signed to curb the abuses of price fixing, and it was not even suggested
that they had anything to do with labor organizations.
While these amendments on which the National Association of Manu-
facturers based its contention that closed shop agreements were pro-
hibited apparently were not thought of in Congress as having any bearing
on industrial relations, there is one subsection besides Section 7(a) which
clearly relates to the subject. This is subsection (b) of Section 7, which
immediately follows the much controverted subsection (a). This reads:
(b) The President shall, so far as practicable, afford every opportunity to employers
and employees in any trade or industry or subdivision thereof with respect to which the
conditions referred to in clauses (i) and (2) of subsection (a) prevail, to establish by
mutual agreement, the standards as to the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of
pay, and such other conditions of employment as may be necessary in such trade or in-
dustry or subdivision thereof to effectuate the policy of this title; and the standards
established in such agreements, when approved by the President, shall have the same
effect as a code of fair competition, approved by the President under subsection (a) of
section 3.
While this subsection, strangely, has hardly been noticed in discussions
of the labor provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, it dearly
must be taken into consideration in determining the intent of Congress in
enacting Section 7(a). Subsection (a), as we have seen, is not new in
principle, but subsection (b) is new. In subsection (a) Congress merely
reiterated the right of workingmen to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice and prohibited interference by employers
with this right. In subsection (b) it made it the duty of the President to
"afford every opportunity to employers and employes in any trade or
industry or subdivision thereof" to formulate the labor provisions of in-
dustrial codes through collective bargaining and by "mutual agreement."
This completes the brief review of the background and history of the
labor provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act which it is the
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purpose of this article to present. A few comments, however, may be
apposite. The much debated Section 7(a) was not an innovation, nor was
it "slipped over" by the labor unions or their congressional supporters.
It was little more than a reiteration of principles which have frequently
found expression in congressional legislation in recent years and was en-
acted after representatives of employing interests had warned Congress
that it was putting its stamp of approval on the labor unions. In the labor
provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were only two features
which represented any change whatsoever from prior legislation: (i) the
specific mention of company unions; (2) the affirmative direction to the
President to afford every possible opportunity to employers and em-
ployees to bargain collectively on conditions of labor. These changes
merely made more specific the policies previously expressed and were de-
liberate. If anything is clear from the congressional history of the labor
provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, it is that Congress in-
tended that employers signing codes must refrain from using company
unions to block labor organizations and that such employers obligate
themselves to deal or attempt to deal with the labor unions when a major-
ity of their employees so desire. Upon what constitutes collective bar-
gaining, particularly whether company unionism is collective bargaining,
the record is less clear. No member of Congress said a kind word for the
company unions at any stage of the consideration of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, while several senators scored them unmercifully. This
evidence, however, is insufficient to establish what was the intent of Con-
gress on the crucial question of company unionism, aside from coercion.
If Congress intended that dealing with a company promoted plant union
is not to be recognized as collective bargaining, it should make this clear
through an amendment to Section 7(a).
